China's 'Neo-Totalitarianism' and Its Apocalyptic Vision

May 23, 2024

Many scholars view China’s current political characteristics as a post-totalitarian political system, but the author believes that the current political system in China may be better defined as a “neo-totalitarian” system. This article first explains why the concept of “neo-totalitarianism” is proposed and then analyzes the basic characteristics of China’s current “neo-totalitarian” system, followed by a preliminary judgment on its prospects.

Table of Contents

I. From Totalitarianism, Post-Totalitarianism to ‘Neo-Totalitarianism’

Since the emergence of totalitarian regimes in the 1920s and 1930s, a series of major historical events related to totalitarian systems have occurred in human history. From the establishment of Nazi Germany and Stalin’s regime, World War II, to the Cold War, and through the dramatic changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in 1989, from the establishment of China’s political system after 1949 to the “Cultural Revolution,” the reform and opening up, and the “June Fourth Incident,” some totalitarian regimes have collapsed, while others have constantly adapted under internal and external pressures, attempting to survive in new forms.

The most typical prototype of a totalitarian system is the Nazi Germany and Stalinist rule in the Soviet Union. After World War II, with the defeat of Nazi Germany, Stalinist rule became the representative of the totalitarian system. However, due to the tremendous changes in the political, economic, cultural, and value landscape of the world after World War II, no totalitarian regime could survive in a closed state. They had various needs from the outside world, such as trade, investment, strategic cooperation, and ideological support, and therefore had to consider the external world’s views on them, requiring corresponding adjustments to their ruling forms and policies. After Stalin’s death, the Soviet Union’s “de-Stalinization” was a form of self-adjustment within the totalitarian system. Therefore, some scholars refer to the Soviet and Eastern European systems after Stalin as post-totalitarian systems, distinguishing them from the Stalinist model of totalitarianism. The countries under the post-totalitarian system are those in the past referred to as the “socialist camp,” which also includes countries that have conflicts and contradictions with the core countries of this “camp” but have similar systems.

From this perspective, China’s political system from 1949 to the end of the “Cultural Revolution” was close to the prototype of a totalitarian system. In other words, the day the Soviet Union entered the post-totalitarian system was the time when China strengthened and consolidated its totalitarian system. China’s Stalinist totalitarian era ended with the death of Mao Zedong, and there was a relatively relaxed political period in China at that time. A political scientist pointed out, “In the Soviet Union in the late 1950s and early 1960s, Khrushchev used thawing to deal with his Stalinist opponents. In the 1980s, Deng Xiaoping used cultural liberalization (emancipating the mind) to let the economic modernization faction deal with their (Maoist) opponents.” This political relaxation and the beginning of economic reforms marked China’s entry into a relatively typical post-totalitarian system. In the post-totalitarian era, the discourse on the “Four Modernizations,” “emancipating the mind,” and “political democracy” once mobilized and stimulated the new political enthusiasm of the people. However, this political relaxation did not mean the disappearance of the totalitarian nature of the system; it merely reestablished the legitimacy of the autocratic system through adaptation. This post-totalitarianism, when necessary, would resort to violence and terror like totalitarianism (such as the “Hungarian Incident,” the “Warsaw Pact” invasion of Prague, the “June Fourth Incident,” etc.).

Post-totalitarianism cannot truly save the inevitable decline of this system, as evidenced by the successive collapse of post-totalitarianism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Of course, the sudden occurrence of these historical events after 1989 also contained some accidental factors. With the dramatic changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and the end of the Cold War, most of the countries under the post-totalitarian system abandoned this political system. Therefore, some people believe that post-totalitarianism will soon become a thing of the past. However, the author believes that, in the case of China, such a judgment is overly simplistic.

The bloody reality of the “June Fourth Incident” showed the Chinese people that the period of relative ideological relaxation after the “Cultural Revolution” did not represent a complete break with totalitarianism and the beginning of a new era in China, as violence and terror could still be replayed at any time. Therefore, the political enthusiasm shown by the people during the early stages of the “89 Democracy Movement” was replaced by political despair and apathy since the 1990s.

After 1989, China’s political system did indeed bid farewell to the post-totalitarian model, but it did not move towards enlightened political progress. Instead, it turned back to the prototype of totalitarianism, but the system that had experienced the post-totalitarian era could not completely return to the track of the Stalinist model, forming the current system that has both some characteristics borrowed from the totalitarian prototype and some remnants of the post-totalitarian era, while also having a series of new features never seen before in the history of totalitarianism (see Section 4 for details).

The author believes that the system gradually formed in China after 1989 can be called a “neo-totalitarian” system because it differs from the totalitarian prototype but has deep political roots in the totalitarian prototype; on the other hand, it evolved from post-totalitarianism but has distinct differences from post-totalitarianism. “Neo-totalitarianism” is a variation of the post-totalitarian system, reflecting an attempt to partially return to the totalitarian prototype. Although the interest groups parasitic on this system have survived through this variation, “neo-totalitarianism” itself is in a series of insurmountable dilemmas. The reality of worsening political, economic, and social problems under “neo-totalitarianism” shows that this variation is clearly not a progressive way out.

“Neo-totalitarianism” has an inescapable fear and anxiety about the protest events that emerged during the post-totalitarian period (such as the Hungarian Revolution, the “Charter 77” in Czechoslovakia, the “Solidarity” in Poland, and China’s “89 Democracy Movement”), as well as the “color revolutions” in the 21st century in Central Asia, where people demanded democracy. It views the political relaxation of the post-totalitarian era as “weakness” and mistakes in politics, and since 1989, it has significantly strengthened social control and thought control, with many new political restrictions returning to the totalitarian prototype. However, it no longer possesses the ideological mobilization capabilities of the totalitarian prototype and can only sustain its corrupt and inefficient ruling machine through makeshift slogans, shortsighted thought control, and harsh measures (such as increasingly severe media and internet controls, as well as the use of force to suppress collective protests).

The economic development under “neo-totalitarianism” comes at the expense of comprehensive social justice. The opportunities brought by economic liberalization are mostly monopolized by the power elite. “Let some people get rich first” has turned into letting only members of the power elite get rich; meanwhile, the economic “marketization” has become an excuse for the authorities to abandon the responsibility of maintaining social justice and offload the “burden” of social welfare expenditures, leaving the vast majority of the population as vulnerable groups with almost no social welfare guarantees.

The superficial economic prosperity under the “neo-totalitarian” system masks a series of serious economic and social problems, such as rampant corruption, judicial injustice, a widening gap between the rich and the poor, the helpless despair of vulnerable groups, resource exploitation and destruction, the obstruction of public opinion, lack of trust, political apathy, and more. These problems are caused by the “neo-totalitarian” system itself and cannot be genuinely resolved within this system. Although the rulers of the “neo-totalitarian” system have proposed slogans such as “Three Represents,” “Governing for the People,” “Maintaining the Advanced Nature of Communist Party Members,” and “Harmonious Society,” in a system where political democratization is stagnant and public speech and press freedom are severely restricted, these slogans are essentially just propaganda tools to appease the people and do not indicate that the advocates of these slogans intend to address the institutional roots of the problems mentioned above. A typical feature of “neo-totalitarianism” in dealing with reality is “treating the symptoms but not the root causes,” which means it cannot find a systematic, comprehensive, and forward-looking strategy for change within the existing system.

The “newness” of “neo-totalitarianism” is relative to “post-totalitarianism,” and this “newness” itself does not imply a bright future; on the contrary, the emergency measures of “neo-totalitarianism” have created apocalyptic features in various aspects, dooming it to have no way out. The “neo-totalitarian” system is one that appears economically successful, but this superficial economic achievement does not mean it has found the secret to extending its lifespan; on the contrary, the political, social, and moral crises hidden beneath the surface of economic achievements highlight the system’s deep-seated dead end. This dead end lies in the disintegration of political ethics, social ideals, and communal values, making it impossible for both the ruling elite and the people to rely on the existing system to rebuild a hopeful alternative system supported by shared values that can gain broad social recognition. The dead end of the “neo-totalitarian” system is a systemic dead end, not the dead end of a specific political party. A political party can obstruct systemic change but can also facilitate systemic reform. Only when a political party hijacks the entire system does it have to take responsibility for the system’s dead end. The dead end of “neo-totalitarianism” refers not to a specific political party’s power crisis but to a crisis where the nation and people cannot completely break away from the totalitarian system and rebuild a bright future.

In the literature on totalitarianism, Hannah Arendt’s The Origins of Totalitarianism remains a classic text. Published in the early 1950s, this work studies the totalitarian prototypes of Nazi Germany and Stalinist Soviet Union. Since then, as Eastern Europe, China, and other totalitarian countries in Asia have exhibited different characteristics from these two prototypes, scholars have begun to use additional terms to define various distinctive forms of totalitarianism. For example, in 1964, Kasoff proposed the concept of “non-terroristic totalitarianism,” in the mid-1970s, Linz introduced the term “post-totalitarianism,” and in the 1980s, Walzer coined the phrase “failed totalitarianism.” The concept of “neo-totalitarianism” proposed by the author is a similar expression.

Leszek Kołakowski once said, “It is generally accepted that concepts used to describe large social phenomena do not have perfect corresponding objects in empirical reality. There has never been a purely capitalist society, but this does not prevent us from using the useful distinction between capitalist and pre-capitalist economies. There has never been absolute freedom, but this does not prevent people from believing in and understanding the difference between a free regime and a despotic one. In fact, existing totalitarian societies are closer to their conceptual prototypes than any capitalist society is to its concept.”

Hannah Arendt’s analysis of the characteristics of totalitarianism from half a century ago is still of great significance for understanding the evolving “neo-totalitarianism” today. The totalitarian elements she identified, such as violence and terror, thought control aimed at transforming human nature, “propaganda” as a means of deception, “organization” as an oligarchic power mechanism, and the existence of “masses” in isolated atomic forms, can still help us identify various forms of totalitarianism. A comparison of these elements can show us the fundamental differences between totalitarianism and traditional authoritarianism and help us understand the long-lasting damage totalitarianism does to human nature and the unique significance of resistance under totalitarian rule. The following sections analyze “neo-totalitarianism” from these perspectives.

II. The Continuation of the ‘Servile Personality’ and the Awakening of Popular Self-Consciousness Under ‘Neo-Totalitarianism’

In The Origins of Totalitarianism, Hannah Arendt summarizes three pillars on which totalitarianism relies: concentration camps that use violence to transform human nature, keeping the masses in a state of isolation without a common means of resistance, and the centralized use of propaganda and organizational tools to maintain totalitarian rule. Observing the evolution of totalitarianism from its prototype to post-totalitarianism and then to “neo-totalitarianism” through these three lenses reveals the most obvious and visible changes in the first aspect, the most subtle and complex changes in the second aspect, and the least changes in the third aspect. The first two aspects have changed out of necessity, while the last one has remained unchanged as much as possible.

The primary pillar of totalitarian rule is terror and violence, and concentration camps are the prototype institutions of totalitarian society’s machinery of terror, exemplifying totalitarian violence to the greatest extent. Totalitarian violence does not aim to physically eliminate everyone, but rather to eliminate human beings in a true sense through a “three-step process.”

The first step is the “killing of the legal person,” meaning the deprivation of basic political and civil rights. “Destroying a person’s rights and killing him as a legal person is the precondition for total domination.”

The second step is the “killing of the moral person,” making the victim “unable to become a martyr for the first time in history.” Under political repression, it may seem that “conscience can still allow people to choose to die rather than harm others in order to survive.” However, this resistance of conscience can also be destroyed under the extreme harshness of totalitarian rule. Conscience is a personal escape. “When totalitarian terror achieves its most terrifying success, it can completely block the escape route of the moral person, making the decisions of conscience extremely questionable and ambiguous. When a person’s choice is to either betray and thereby kill friends or let his wife and children die, when a person’s suicide would immediately bring death to his family, how can he make a decision of conscience? He is no longer choosing between good and evil, but between murder and murder.” Under totalitarian rule, it is difficult to find a person with moral integrity, as the victims are often to some extent involved in the harm of others, so no individual’s experience can have the moral power of a martyr’s accusation.

The third and more terrifying step is to kill off individual thought and creativity, ultimately turning people into walking dead. Under totalitarian rule, people do not resist no matter how much harm or humiliation they suffer. “Destroying individuality means destroying spontaneity, the ability of people to start anew on their own.” The totalitarian prototype usually strives to eliminate individual thought and creativity, and the evolutions such as post-totalitarianism and “neo-totalitarianism” are all based on this premise, even though the latter two may not appear as cruel and bloody as the totalitarian prototype, because the totalitarian prototype had already created obedient subjects through violence and fear for its successors.

When the totalitarian prototype transitions to post-totalitarianism, the concentration camps as laboratories for revolutionary violence and human nature transformation are abandoned. The large-scale rehabilitation and correction of wrongful cases in the Soviet Union during the “de-Stalinization” period and in China after the “Cultural Revolution” are the most dramatic displays of this transition. However, this transition is often only superficial. This is primarily because post-totalitarianism has never given up on treating anyone who dares to openly challenge its authority and legitimacy with violence. Secondly, the large-scale violence and terror of the totalitarian prototype had long successfully transformed human nature, creating a servile personality in the entire society that the totalitarian system needed. This widespread compliance, obedience, and caution would continue to regenerate under post-totalitarianism and “neo-totalitarianism,” creating a society that cannot escape a psychological state of fear.

The second pillar of totalitarianism is the “atomized masses,” which form the basis and social condition supporting totalitarian power. Under the rule of the totalitarian prototype, the so-called “atomized masses” refer to a public that does not have common values or a sense of justice in public life but is merely a group of individuals who are isolated and lack genuine public life. Due to the high degree of atomization and isolation of each individual in the group, they no longer share a common world, can no longer engage freely in politics and value judgment, and therefore cannot form a real human society. The only thing that connects them is their participation in a “movement,” their collective response to the call of a particular ideology, their collective obedience to an irresistible political power, their collective worship of a charismatic leader, and their collective entrapment in an unchangeable system. In a totalitarian state, political organizational forms of the public, such as competing independent political parties, trade unions, associations, and so on, cannot exist.

As post-totalitarianism evolves into “neo-totalitarianism,” some of the public begin to gradually develop an increasingly strong sense of self-awareness. They no longer believe that those in power naturally represent their interests and are increasingly aware of their desire to break free from this “atomized state” and protect their interests and voice their concerns through spontaneously formed civil society organizations. The democratic demands of the people in 1989 were a prominent example. However, at the same time, they were powerless to change the institutional environment and had to remain in the “atomized state.” In the face of such a situation, people exhibit different attitudes, ranging from self-abandonment, submission, cynicism, sarcasm, indignation, to active resistance. These various reactions mean that the “masses” faced by the authorities under post-totalitarianism and “neo-totalitarianism” have already transformed into a pluralistic and diversified society, which is completely different from the totalitarian prototype period.

During China’s post-totalitarian period, the commercialization of media and the internet had not yet emerged, but under “neo-totalitarianism,” these tools have created conditions for the awakening of popular self-awareness. However, the authorities have also continuously worked to strengthen control over the media and the internet. The online world has provided an unprecedented space for the expression of dissenting voices from civil society, but most people dare to express relatively true opinions only under the protection of anonymity, which is different from those who participate in online exchanges under their real names and are accountable for their words and actions. The internet is primarily a world of the educated, a world that demands freedom of thought but does not necessarily demand immediate action. However, it has made the once relatively hidden dissatisfaction and protests of the public more apparent than ever. This has deepened the fears of “neo-totalitarianism,” which sees online “resistance” as a warning sign of real-world resistance, leading to further efforts to tighten thought control, including the strict internet management regulations introduced in 2005. “Neo-totalitarianism” will spare no effort to enhance its control over the internet, but online criticism and resistance will continue. For the construction of a genuine civil society, this is a “cat and mouse game” with more destructive power than constructive power, although it makes “neo-totalitarianism” feel a considerable sense of threat.

III. ‘Organizational’ Control and ‘Propaganda’ Operations Under ‘Neo-Totalitarianism’

The third pillar of totalitarianism is the organization and propaganda of autocratic rule. In the evolution from totalitarianism to post-totalitarianism and then to “neo-totalitarianism,” this aspect has changed little, if at all, indicating that organization and propaganda have played a crucial role in the inheritance of totalitarianism.

Members of general political parties can freely choose to join or leave, not only in democratic countries but also in some “democratic parties” in China before 1949. However, the organizational nature of totalitarian parties usually resembles that of secret societies, to the point where they are even referred to as “secret societies in broad daylight.” Many of their organizational characteristics can be found in general secret societies. For example, the hierarchical system of secret societies is established through “promotion” and “introduction,” where the one who promotes others enjoys the privilege of special loyalty and can form cliques and alliances; the “boss” in secret societies is always mysterious, unpredictable in actions, to keep “subordinates” in awe; secret societies adhere to the “strategy of unanimous lying” (secrecy), where internal matters are “separate from external affairs,” and violating this principle is met with severe punishment; secret societies remain vigilant against the outside world, viewing it as a source of hostile threats. Totalitarian parties and secret societies both highly value organizational loyalty and rituals, as well as symbols, where joining requires internal introductions and loyalty oaths, and the punishment for traitors is often harsher than that for enemies. They all have supreme “sacred objects.” “The so-called ‘blood community’ of Nazi rituals and Lenin’s corpse in Bolshevik rituals made totalitarian rituals have the color of idol worship. … These idols are common organizational tools in secret societies.”

These secret society characteristics make totalitarian parties fundamentally different from general parties. Arendt points out, “General parties divide people into those who belong to and those who do not belong to the party. General parties and open societies only view those who openly express opposition as enemies, while the principle of secret societies is, ‘Those I do not absorb, I exclude.’” In the eyes of totalitarian parties, as long as you do not follow them wholeheartedly, you are a threat or an enemy. This dichotomy of “either party or enemy” among the masses is also the principle of internal party unity. It is through the elimination of party democracy that one-party dictatorship is transformed into totalitarian rule. “Stalin transformed Russia’s one-party dictatorship into totalitarian rule and transformed the world’s revolutionary communist parties into totalitarian movements. The means he used was the elimination of factions within the party, the abolition of party core internal democracy, and the conversion of national communist parties into party branches under Moscow’s command.” Arendt’s insight was based on the actual situation of the “Comintern” in the 1940s, and this point remains unchanged. Today’s “neo-totalitarianism” still does not allow for intra-party democracy or dissenting opinions.

Under “neo-totalitarianism,” the motivation for ordinary party members to join the party differs from that during the totalitarian prototype and post-totalitarian stages. Members who joined the totalitarian movement before it gained power were often inspired by ideals and values. Once the party gained power, people began to see party membership as a “stepping stone” to political and social status. The “failed totalitarianism” produced disillusionment and disappointment with its ideals and values, making the pursuit of vested interests and privileges a more realistic motivation for joining the party than the pursuit of ideal values. In the post-totalitarian period, party members indeed had many tangible benefits to share, as the party controlled the vast majority of state and social resources. However, in the “neo-totalitarian” period, the ruling party can no longer monopolize all economic resources, and in a society dominated by money worship, party membership is no longer a universally admired symbol of political status. People have many opportunities to obtain benefits and privileges that previously required political status to acquire. Nevertheless, “neo-totalitarianism” still attracts many to join the party, especially among young students, as party membership remains a valuable asset for job seekers. Many employers prefer to hire candidates with party membership, not because they expect them to spread communism, but because “party members” are seen as particularly obedient, easy to manage, non-disruptive, yet sharp. In government agencies and bureaucratic enterprises, the party-member personality is considered the best model of a compliant tool.

For totalitarianism, organization control is as important as propaganda. The role of propaganda varies depending on the different stages of totalitarianism. When the totalitarian movement is still in opposition, its propaganda aims to attract those who have yet to be won over. “Under the conditions of constitutional government and freedom of speech, the masses still have channels to obtain information, and the totalitarian movement’s opportunities to use terror are limited. It must appear to win the public’s trust like other parties.” Once the totalitarian movement succeeds in seizing power, its propaganda transforms into “thought indoctrination.” “Indoctrination itself is supported by political repression and violence. Indoctrination uses terror not so much to intimidate as to demonstrate its own ideological dogma and lies.” Indoctrination can take the form of coercive “thought reform” or seemingly non-coercive “education.” Whether through reform or education, punishment must be the ultimate tool. Only by instilling fear of heretical thoughts in everyone can the invincibility and absolute correctness of “right thought” be demonstrated.

This “fear of education” described by Arendt is being created and regenerated within the education system under “neo-totalitarian” rule. Teachers indoctrinate students with the dogma that has been indoctrinated into their own minds, and students use this indoctrinated content to test whether teachers are always carrying out “correct” indoctrination. In May 2005, Lu Xuesong, a teacher at the Jilin Art Institute, was “reported” by a student for using a homemade documentary commemorating Lin Zhao and related materials during a class. She was subsequently “suspended from teaching” by the school. This incident sparked heated discussion online. If we refer to the three parties involved as “teachers,” “students,” and “leaders,” we can see a typical example of how teachers and students interact under the “fear of education.” Although Lin Zhao’s wrongful case had been “redressed,” in the eyes of a “student” raised under the party’s propaganda and education, praising Lin Zhao, who was executed by the party, was tantamount to tarnishing the party’s image. Under the supervision of such “students,” “teachers” cannot teach “without fear” in schools. No matter how careful the “teacher” is, they may still violate some political taboos embedded in the “students’” minds. Once a “student” reports a “teacher” to the “leaders,” the “leaders” find themselves in a “fearful” situation. If they do not punish the “teacher,” the “leaders” may be seen as ideological accomplices of the “teacher” and be reported themselves. The party that implements “thought indoctrination” places “teachers” and “leaders” in such a relationship, causing permanent rights, moral, and individual harm to all involved.

Indoctrination and education are traditional methods of totalitarian ideological operations. What distinguishes totalitarian rule from other forms of autocracy, tyranny, and dictatorship is that totalitarian “political oppression” uses the unique method of ideological operations, and its oppression targets people’s thoughts and thinkers. If this oppression is carried out thoroughly and successfully, people will inevitably degenerate into non-thinking and unable-to-think animals. This is the most terrifying aspect of totalitarian rule. Totalitarianism does not necessarily deprive people of their basic physiological needs (such as food, clothing, shelter), but it never allows them to think freely. Totalitarian prototypes and “neo-totalitarianism” are both hostile to people’s free thought, seeing it as a scourge. The difference between the two is that the latter opposes the forms of free thought (such as democratic institutions) to people’s physiological needs (i.e., so-called “stability”), even encouraging people to indulge in physical desires, making them believe that this is the only pursuit in life, thereby leading them to neglect the need for free thought. Thus, the deprivation of political freedom and the indulgence of physical desires simultaneously become effective tools for “neo-totalitarianism” to control people’s thoughts.

George Orwell’s 1984 and Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World both made predictions about totalitarianism: “Orwell feared those who would ban books, Huxley feared that there would be no reason to ban a book because no one would want to read one; Orwell feared those who would deprive us of information, Huxley feared that people would be reduced to passivity and egoism in the flood of information; Orwell feared that the truth would be concealed from us, Huxley feared that the truth would be drowned in a sea of irrelevance; Orwell feared that our culture would become a captive culture, Huxley feared that our culture would become a trivial culture preoccupied with sensation, desire, and ephemeral games… Orwell feared that what we hate will ruin us, Huxley feared that we will be ruined by what we love.”

The ideology of totalitarianism is a form of “modern lies,” which are fundamentally different from “traditional lies.” “Traditional lies” are falsehoods about “specific” concrete facts, used to deceive “enemies”; totalitarian “modern lies” involve “reweaving the entire fabric of reality,” and they are meant to deceive everyone, with the result that the weavers of these lies “ultimately become the deceived themselves.” In totalitarian ideology, there are “class struggles” without “class enemies,” “democracy” without popular sovereignty, “constitutionalism” without respect for the constitution, “freedom of speech” that silences dissent, “citizens” without rights or legal protection, “servants of the people” who hold more power and privilege than “the people,” and representatives of “proletarian class interests” who are more friendly to capitalists than to workers.

If we compare the nature of ideological lies in totalitarianism, we can say that “neo-totalitarianism” is no different from previous forms of totalitarianism in this regard, but there is a significant difference in the social mobilization capacity of ideological lies between the totalitarian prototype period and the “neo-totalitarianism” era. In the totalitarian prototype period, socialism and communism were once universally accepted and powerful political gospels, as well as moral and behavioral norms that guided people’s thoughts. In the post-totalitarian era, people began to harbor widespread doubts and disappointment about whether the ruling party truly represented these two ideologies, and their faith in these ideologies began to fade. In the “neo-totalitarian” era, the public is often unwilling to show even superficial respect for totalitarian ideology, often expressing their disgust with open ridicule. Nevertheless, “neo-totalitarianism” continues to insist on its consistent “thought indoctrination.”

IV. The Formation and Political Characteristics of ‘Neo-Totalitarianism’

The formation of “neo-totalitarianism” was gradually completed through the process of learning from the lessons of post-totalitarianism. The “June Fourth Incident” and the dramatic changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe made China’s top power group realize that the post-totalitarian path from 1978 to 1989 was a political failure, and if the ruling power group wanted to continue its rule, it had to learn from the lessons of post-totalitarianism and adopt a series of new measures and strategies.

Two principles can be observed in the formation of “neo-totalitarianism.” The first is to maintain a high degree of apocalyptic awareness, which, under this awareness, leads to ruthless decisions and a lack of “softness” towards the governed. Since 1989, the authorities have developed an unprecedented apocalyptic fear of their ruling prospects, which has stimulated a strong sense of vigilance. Even the slightest shock raises concerns about the “downfall of the party and the state,” leading the authorities to lack confidence in “positive” guidance and instead reemphasize and strengthen the traditional repression methods of totalitarian rule. For example, they have increased the power of the secret police departments and relied on them to extensively infiltrate and monitor society domestically, further strengthening the organizational and propaganda systems of totalitarianism, tightening control over the media, public opinion, and civil discourse, and more. Without a doubt, these measures are a regression from post-totalitarianism back to the totalitarian prototype. The second principle is to use flexible strategies to resolve difficulties and create opportunities for the ruling group. This flexibility is reflected in many aspects, such as ideological guidelines (e.g., Deng Xiaoping’s “no debate” policy on the ideological issue of “socialism or capitalism”) and economic policy choices. The reason why such pragmatic strategies are considered part of “neo-totalitarianism” is that the fundamental purpose of these strategies is to consolidate and strengthen totalitarian rule rather than weaken or dismantle it.

In terms of ideological management, “neo-totalitarianism” not only insists on the basic principles of totalitarian political rule, resolutely suppressing civil demands for democratization, but also allows for the active and prosperous development of popular culture and entertainment, as well as the non-ideologicalization of everyday life, thereby diverting the public’s attention toward directions harmless to the authorities. However, the official ideology’s withdrawal from these areas does not mean that it has abandoned control over these activities. The reality of totalitarian political rule ensures that the official ideology can intervene and dominate civil cultural and entertainment activities at any time.

In terms of economic policy and social policies, “neo-totalitarianism” is much more flexible in its pragmatic strategies and much less “soft” towards the governed than post-totalitarianism. Post-totalitarianism did not dare to completely deviate from the traditional totalitarian system of predominantly public ownership while also emphasizing a strategy of appeasing the public primarily through soft means to win the people’s hearts; however, “neo-totalitarianism” has essentially abandoned both of these.

From the “Cultural Revolution” to 1989, during China’s post-totalitarian system, the planned economy and public ownership still held important positions. But since the 1990s, the authorities have shown a high degree of flexibility in economic policies, seeking help from foreign capital, joining economic globalization, essentially abolishing the planned economy system, and simultaneously weakening the importance of public ownership.

During the post-totalitarian period, the rulers maintained the “happiness transaction law” of authoritarian socialism, which used social welfare arrangements (such as guaranteed job opportunities, housing, free education, and healthcare) in exchange for the people’s political compliance. The people, though giving up personal political freedom and civil rights, gained basic living conditions in return. However, since the 1990s, the “happiness transaction law” has been replaced by the “law of the jungle.” As long as one does not belong to the power elite or its dependent groups, ordinary people now lack both civil rights protection and social welfare guarantees, adding three new burdens (housing, education, healthcare) to the original political oppression. Since the 1990s, the authorities have been more severe in suppressing social discontent than during the post-totalitarian period. Although the majority of the population’s survival has become much more difficult than during the post-totalitarian period, they can only endure silently.

“Neo-totalitarianism” boldly incorporates the “enemy factors” of Stalinist totalitarian rule (such as capitalism and red capitalists) into its system, while also displaying great tolerance for phenomena that completely contradict its self-proclaimed “social advancement” (such as corruption, decadence, pornography, etc.). For “neo-totalitarianism,” such flexibility is clearly a double-edged sword. On one hand, it maintains and extends the totalitarian system, but on the other hand, it fundamentally undermines the authenticity of totalitarian ideology. When in reality, “socialism” becomes more capitalist than capitalist countries, when “the working class as the leading class” becomes a vulnerable group, when the “communist ideal” manifests as “luxury at the gate while bones freeze on the road,” the inherited ideology of “neo-totalitarianism” becomes a tattered “emperor’s new clothes.” Some have even pointed out more sharply, “The problem now is not that the emperor is not wearing clothes, but that under the clothes, there is no emperor at all.”

From the totalitarian prototype to post-totalitarianism and then to “neo-totalitarianism,” they all share an unchanging commonality: the totalitarian master, an invisible, supreme “party boss,” as the embodiment of the legitimacy of totalitarian rule. This master uses official ideology to proclaim itself as eternally “glorious, great, and correct.” No matter what kind of breaks occur in the political system (such as the arrest of the “Gang of Four” in 1976), and no matter how sharply the reality of totalitarian rule contradicts its orthodox ideology, the party always claims that it is the forever insightful force that understands the laws of historical development and represents the direction of historical progress. With its self-proclaimed supreme position, it can arbitrarily define who the “enemies” of “history” or “the people” are and, at any time, mobilize whatever violence it deems necessary to ruthlessly eliminate its enemies. It can dominate economic, news, publishing, judicial, educational, cultural, and other fields, and it can override constitutional institutions, arbitrarily changing constitutional provisions or their interpretations according to its needs. This is one of the main distinctions between totalitarian despotism and authoritarian rule.

The difference between totalitarian despotism and authoritarian rule does not lie in whether political oppression (such as deprivation of civil rights, suppression of human rights, control of speech and association, news monopoly, etc.) exists, but in the name under which political oppression is carried out and to what extent and scope violence is used. In authoritarian states, people can directly appeal to democracy, human rights, and civil rights to resist tyranny, and authoritarian rulers have no excuse to counter the ideals of democracy and freedom other than using rhetoric like “national security.” However, under totalitarian rule, the authorities can justify any demand for democracy by accusing it of being “hostile” or “subversive.” Even if someone merely expresses concern for public affairs or vulnerable groups, they may face persecution under totalitarian rule.

Let me give you an example. Last year, the Jiefang Daily in Shanghai published an article under the pseudonym “Jifangping” (a homophone of Jiefang Daily’s commentator) criticizing “public intellectuals” (the article was titled “Seeing the Essence Through the Phenomenon” and was published on November 15, 2004). The article stated, “The essence of proposing the concept of ‘public intellectuals’ is to alienate intellectuals from the party and from the masses. Public intellectuals… have never been ‘independent.’ Intellectuals are part of the working class, they are members of the masses, they are a group under the leadership of the party… The value of intellectuals lies in serving socialism and serving the masses.” The language used by “Jifangping” is typical of traditional totalitarian ideology and expresses the thinking of totalitarian despotism. If it were in an authoritarian state, the authorities might force intellectuals to keep silent and persecute those who do not comply, but they would not be able to say openly and justifiably that all intellectuals must be led by a particular party. Intellectuals who are not party members naturally would not be required to follow that party’s leadership. However, under totalitarianism, the authorities, following their ideology, “righteously” place all social members under their “leadership,” implementing the strictest thought control in modern society, allowing no one to question their permanent and unique leadership position, and permitting no intellectual independence in thought or social activity.

Some may wonder why intellectuals must be strictly controlled by the party, why they cannot maintain their independence, why they cannot concern themselves with public affairs, or why they cannot criticize official corruption, judicial injustice, rampant organized crime, or the widening gap between the rich and the poor. In a democratic society, such questions would not even need to be asked, and in an authoritarian state, the authorities would generally be unwilling to express a negative attitude towards such questions. However, under totalitarian rule, simply raising these questions is considered a grave offense.

“Neo-totalitarianism” differs significantly from the totalitarian prototype in one major aspect: it no longer relies on charismatic leaders. Hannah Arendt, when studying totalitarianism, noted that charismatic leaders like Hitler or Stalin were essentially “heroes of troubled times,” typical products of modern crises characterized by the collapse of social traditions and order. The success of such “heroes of troubled times” is full of contingency and does not necessarily depend on the moral qualities or beliefs of the leader. On the contrary, those with moral qualities and beliefs are often the first to be killed by such “heroes of troubled times.” Arendt also argued that the importance of the supreme leader in a totalitarian system lies in the structural position he occupies within the party organization. It is the position that is important, not necessarily the individual leader. This conclusion fully applies to the analysis of “neo-totalitarianism.”

The technocratic rulers of “neo-totalitarianism,” while at the highest levels of the party, are not themselves the embodiment of the party. Instead, they resemble carefully selected stewards or managers tasked with handling the interests of the “party master.” Although the highest leaders of “neo-totalitarianism” may be relatively “people-friendly,” “diligent,” or “clean,” the “party master” they serve is still as domineering, all-powerful, and controlling as it was during the totalitarian prototype era. These technocratic rulers were carefully chosen to operate and maintain the totalitarian machine because of the favor of their selectors and promoters. They are products of what Arendt described as the “party secret society.” They are the most experienced members of the party bureaucracy, best suited to its survival of the fittest principles. Smoothness and staying within bounds are the conditions for their survival, and seeking stability and avoiding major mistakes have been their credo for many years. Politically, they lack the tolerance and pioneering spirit of post-totalitarian leaders, so they often propose remedial measures or slogans only passively and reactively after changes in the situation, which may or may not be effective (such as the “Three Represents,” “Harmonious Society,” and “Maintaining Advanced Nature”). They complacently elevate these localized remedial measures or slogans to the level of national development and social system construction missions, replacing the nation’s fundamental political vision and ideals with routine administration, while being shortsighted and oblivious to it. The ultimate goal of “neo-totalitarianism” is nothing more than “power for the sake of power.” “The rulers hold on to power without a ‘higher’ purpose. They suppress their enemies, control their subjects, and make minor adjustments in domestic and foreign policies… Their language is merely a bureaucratic rehash of ‘old sayings,’ a routine display of ideological posturing. Sometimes they seem to live off memories of totalitarian moments, but they do not want to repeat such moments. They are today’s dictators and oligarchic politicians, and their actions are no different from those of past dictators and oligarchic politicians.”

The value-deficient governance of “neo-totalitarianism” often manifests as a form of “schizophrenia”: “On the one hand, ‘Marxism’ is still referred to as the ‘guiding theory,’ while on the other hand, the ‘economic liberalism’ that fiercely denies Marxism has long become the mainstream theory guiding the ‘reform enterprise.’ On the one hand, ‘socialism’ cannot be separated from the constraints of ‘public ownership,’ while on the other hand, ‘privatization’ has gained political correctness and become the ‘main melody.’ On the one hand, they claim to be ‘servants of the people,’ while on the other hand, they are the ‘elite alliance’ that jointly exploits the people, who have no influence on state policies. On the one hand, the banner still reads ‘based on the alliance of workers and peasants,’ while on the other hand, workers and peasants are oppressed and plundered, and they are still not allowed to establish their own autonomous organizations in the face of powerful groups like business associations.”

Compared to the totalitarian prototype and post-totalitarianism, the thought control of “neo-totalitarianism” clearly exhibits an apocalyptic vision, characterized by incompetence, arrogance, bluster, and hypocrisy. During the Mao Zedong era, totalitarian rule once stirred revolutionary passion across the country and even inspired and motivated radical leftists worldwide. After Mao’s death until 1989, the relatively relaxed thought control and socio-economic policies of post-totalitarianism allowed the authorities to briefly gain new legitimacy. Although “neo-totalitarianism” has added new discourses like the “market economy” and nationalism, it remains unable to escape an unprecedented ideological isolation, to the point that after entering the 21st century, it even sought ideological partners in declining countries like North Korea and Cuba.

It is precisely because “neo-totalitarianism” rejects the global trend of pursuing human rights and democracy that, although it has used foreign capital to enhance China’s economic strength, it has never been able to establish a moral image in global politics. On the contrary, it is filled with suspicion and hostility towards both domestic and international calls for political reform and social justice. “Neo-totalitarianism” is a degenerate form of privileged oligarchic despotism, driven by an intense desire for power and material gain, yet morally and ideologically numb. It is a predatory capitalist hierarchy, a “pre-modern” autocratic regime that is completely unresponsive to the nation’s future ideals of freedom. The so-called “pre-modern” autocracy refers to “old-fashioned oligarchic politics, bloated, paranoid, mediocre, brutal,” with no political aspirations, no idealistic prospects, and the sole purpose of maintaining existing power and the power system.

In the era of “neo-totalitarianism,” the social dominance once enjoyed by the totalitarian prototype has completely declined. Social dominance, or hegemony as described by Gramsci, refers to the state’s ability to dominate (in terms of rule) and lead (in terms of moral authority), both of which are non-coercive forms of actual influence. Femia, in explaining Gramsci’s view, distinguishes between non-coercive “dominance” and coercive “rule” as follows: “‘Dominance’ refers to the superiority of one class or group over others, a superiority achieved through consent rather than force. ‘Rule,’ on the other hand, is mainly realized through the state’s coercive apparatus. ‘Knowledge or moral leadership’ (dominance) is mainly manifested in and realized through ‘civil society.’” Obviously, the more the state possesses “dominance” over society, the less it needs to resort to coercive “rule,” and the more legitimate it becomes. From 1978 to 1989, during the post-totalitarian period, although the authorities’ socio-economic policies were welcomed, the relative political relaxation gradually led to the loss of totalitarian ideology’s dominance over society, which ultimately led to the “June Fourth Incident.” During the “neo-totalitarian” period, totalitarian ideology’s dominance over Communist Party members quickly diminished, as rampant corruption among party cadres at all levels indicated that everyone was eager to grab immediate benefits before the ship sank. Its dominance over non-party members has plummeted even further. Even among its “most conscious,” “most advanced,” and most core members, the apocalyptic vision of “neo-totalitarianism” has already been fully exposed.

Of course, a regime exhibiting apocalyptic characteristics is not necessarily a short-lived one. Sociologist Sun Liping describes Chinese society as “a few stones and a pile of loose sand,” where the “few stones” refer to cohesive interest groups, such as political elites, economic elites, and cultural elites, while the “pile of loose sand” refers to the general public. The social and political structure of “a few stones and a pile of loose sand” allows “neo-totalitarianism” to temporarily maintain its rule. However, when the “loose sand” becomes even looser, or when some of the “stones” break away from the others and disintegrate, “neo-totalitarianism” will face the final fate that befell the totalitarian prototype and post-totalitarianism.

Sun Liping believes that conflicting interests have created a “fractured society” in China. Many Chinese intellectuals are now discussing the phenomenon of “Latin Americanization.” Indeed, contemporary Chinese society resembles the situation in some Latin American countries: the newly wealthy and powerful live in walled, heavily guarded villas and complex apartments, enjoying immense wealth, power, and privileges. In contrast, the rapidly expanding rural poor and urban underprivileged groups, consisting of millions of migrant workers living in temporary shacks and an increasing number of unemployed and low-income urban residents, are being pushed out of city centers by new real estate developments. The crisis faced by urban underprivileged groups is not only one of infrastructure and income but also a battle for the “urban rights” that are essential for making a living in the city, including legal identity, corresponding work rights, education, healthcare, insurance, and social welfare benefits.

The disorganized and fragmented ideology of “neo-totalitarianism” has provided a golden opportunity for vested interest groups to take advantage. Different vested interest groups exploit each other, forming an unholy alliance against the underprivileged groups in society based on utilitarian and instrumental relationships. Since the “loose sand” of the population has not formed a public consciousness and has had no opportunity to organize themselves to voice their collective concerns, the inefficient regime continues to function as usual.

V. Transparent Lies, “Playing Dumb Games,” and “Non-Incidental” Resistance

One of totalitarianism’s great inventions is the creation of a specialized “language” that would not be used in other societies, characterized by rigid and lifeless clichés but, being “official language,” enjoys unquestionable status. This “language” effectively imprisoned people’s thoughts, unifying the living language of life and the diverse thoughts of different people into a single rigid model. Orwell’s 1984 shows us that totalitarian rule is not only about institutional oppression but also mental imprisonment, not only a social and political disaster but also a mental catastrophe. The final secret of totalitarianism’s success lies in its use of language. Once the language used by society’s members is “transformed” to suit the party-state’s way of thinking, “all alternative thoughts” can no longer easily arise. Once this “language” system is established, “thoughts unfriendly to the (party-state) can only exist in an ambiguous wordless state,” because thoughts in this wordless state cannot be expressed in words, they can only be considered fleeting ideas that cannot be grasped by human consciousness. During the harshest periods of totalitarian rule, not only could resistant or oppositional thoughts not exist, but even doubt, cynicism, frivolity, sarcasm, etc., could no longer exist, as public language became a rigid, dogmatic, lifeless arrangement of words.

Totalitarianism’s key is that it uses ideology to almost completely control all of a person’s mental activities, including not only all inner thoughts, feelings, sensations, and emotions that need to be expressed with words but also those ideas destined to only flicker in the dark due to the lack of words. Once the totalitarian “language” system takes hold of those it controls, they cannot understand language from the past or other countries and thus harbor a natural, deep-seated hostility toward it.

“Neo-totalitarianism” has not developed an effective new “official language” and still relies on the language inherited from the prototypes of totalitarianism and post-totalitarianism to control public discourse. Unlike the post-totalitarian era, the disconnect and contradiction between “neo-totalitarianism’s” official language and real life are highly evident, resulting in it becoming a target of public ridicule. Totalitarian rule’s control of language requires a prerequisite: the authorities’ comprehensive and tight regulation of social activities. This comprehensive social control began to loosen during the post-totalitarian period before 1989. During the “neo-totalitarian” period, the authorities further reduced direct intervention in the daily consumption and entertainment activities of the public and used the emerging commercial and popular culture to soften and package their rule. As a result, the influence of “official language” on daily social life has continued to shrink, and the “vocabulary” of “official language” has become increasingly detached from the everyday language of society. Not only can “official language” no longer dominate civil discourse, but it has also become the target of civilian discourse’s sarcasm, mockery, cynicism, banter, and irony. People often treat the official’s repeated top-down proclamations of new and old “rhetoric” with a cynical and indifferent attitude.

As a result, the “official language” of “neo-totalitarianism” is increasingly artificial and exists for performance’s sake, not only in newspaper, television, and radio news reports but also in official cultural programs like the “Spring Festival Gala.”

This leads to the phenomenon of the ideology of “neo-totalitarianism” becoming synonymous with lies. Since 1989, “neo-totalitarianism” has relied on violent repression and media control because its ideology can no longer convince the people. As people increasingly disbelieve these ideological lies, these lies can only be maintained by coercive means. For both the disseminators and audiences under “neo-totalitarianism,” such lies possess a cynical “transparency”: the listeners know the lies, and the liars are well aware that the listeners know. Both parties play a serious “game of playing dumb,” and as long as no one says it out loud, the lie seems like the truth.

“Neo-totalitarianism” can no longer control people’s thoughts, so it satisfies itself by controlling the dissemination of people’s real thoughts, meaning it prevents people from publicly expressing their true thoughts. Thus, “neo-totalitarianism” creates a ruling order characterized by a severe lack of public trust, which still manages to function without trust, provided it is not publicly challenged by any societal trust mechanisms (such as a free press, democratic rule of law, and transparent accountability). From this perspective, “neo-totalitarian” propaganda has essentially failed, as “official language” is almost entirely sustained by the state’s authoritarian administrative power.

“Neo-totalitarianism’s” control of speech and censorship of publications also has a series of characteristics. First, it uses “quiet” methods to directly strike and persecute “heretical thinkers” instead of the high-profile ideological criticism campaigns of the Mao Zedong era and the post-totalitarian period. In a situation where the public no longer believes in “official language,” old-style ideological criticism campaigns not only fail to achieve the desired effect but may also expand the social influence of those being criticized, gaining them more public support and sympathy. Second, the control process has become increasingly technical and covert. In addition to establishing layers of specialized public opinion censorship institutions, the authorities constantly update and expand specific “taboo topics” lists. Besides large topics or issues (such as the “Cultural Revolution,” “June Fourth,” negative evaluations of Mao Zedong, man-made disasters, democracy and human rights, political system defects, etc.) that are forbidden to discuss, many other news topics that may negatively impact the authorities are also placed under temporary “restricted zones.” At the same time, all these “taboo topic” lists are kept as confidential as possible, not only avoiding formal documents but also prohibiting recording or audio recording when transmitted downwards to prevent “negative” international impacts. Additionally, the authorities have intensified the accountability for media “violations,” even severely punishing an editor for an article or shutting down a publishing house for a single book to achieve the effect of “killing one to warn a hundred.” Since the late 1990s, media outlets and websites have had to enhance self-censorship to survive. This self-censorship is not only implemented in the public publication of opinions and viewpoints but also in academic research topics, school curricula, classroom lectures, student thesis directions, and various other aspects.

If the “official language” of the “post-totalitarian” era still treated its audience as propaganda targets, the “official language” of “neo-totalitarianism” often simply treats its audience as fools. The lies of “neo-totalitarianism” are more blatantly contemptuous and degrading to human rationality than the lies of post-totalitarianism, forming a distinctive feature of “neo-totalitarianism’s” “official language.” The reason these almost entirely “transparent” lies are presented to the audience without any hesitation is that “neo-totalitarianism” has grasped a fundamental characteristic of the vast majority of its audience: after careful consideration, they “play dumb.” Although most people have various complaints or dissatisfaction with reality, they are very mindful of the limits of publicly expressing their discontent; they may be resentful but not angry, or they may be angry but not contentious.

The “lie culture” and “play dumb culture” in “neo-totalitarian” society extend from the political field to other aspects of social life, existing not only in social interactions but also being continually reproduced in textbooks, exams, and teacher-student relationships at all levels of schools. “Liars” and “fools” are continually becoming younger and more integrated into everyday life. The inscrutable hearts, cunning minds, erratic behavior, and dark humor under “neo-totalitarian” rule form a uniquely Chinese “masked society.” It is a world where appearances and reality are disconnected, a disconnection that ironically projects onto its “masters,” “liars,” and “fools.” The seemingly arrogant party and government nobles are actually “servants” who cannot make decisions; the eloquent “literary talents,” “eloquent speakers,” or “pens” are, in reality, “liars” who can only say what they are told, without even needing the imagination of a liar, as long as they can recite the “lines” and pretend to be numb to reality. The “fools” among the people are not truly idiots or imbeciles; they are often wise, saying nothing but knowing everything.

These “fake masters,” “fake liars,” and “fake fools” live together in the inhuman society of “neo-totalitarianism.” Over the past few decades, the terror and violence of totalitarianism have transformed everyone in this society—whether “masters,” “liars,” or “fools”—into dominated people to varying degrees. Just as the “fools” lack true freedom and civil rights, the “masters” and “liars” also lack these rights; just as the “masters” are tainted figures in the totalitarian system, the “fools” and “liars” are also morally guilty; just as the “liars” speak for others with their own mouths, the “masters” and “fools” are also deficient in thought and personality.

When the entire population is forced to participate in the “playing dumb game,” it creates the pervasive cynicism and flippancy of “neo-totalitarian” society. At the same time, however, more and more people refuse to continue playing the “playing dumb game” whenever they get the chance. Many people live double lives, simultaneously inhabiting one real and another virtual public space—the online world, where most participants are relatively well-educated. In the real world, their words and actions are restricted by the existing political, social, cultural, and academic systems, and they have to self-censor frequently, aware of the “sensitive issues” everyone knows about, playing dumb to varying degrees. In the online world, they can enjoy a little more freedom, able to take off the “fool’s” mask, speak the truth more easily, and even express their dissatisfaction and resistance clearly and directly. Many social issues, such as official corruption, judicial injustice, the wealth gap, and farmers’ burdens, have only attracted public attention through the online public’s discussions of specific incidents (such as mining disasters, the death of Sun Zhigang, SARS, the Lu Xuesong suspension incident, the Wang Binyu death penalty case, the Taishi Village recall incident, etc.). Online public criticism and condemnation of social injustices are the most explicit manifestations of resistance consciousness in “neo-totalitarian” society. The online public not only often directly disseminates news of resistance events in society (such as collective protests, disturbances, grievances, popular anger incidents, etc.) but also often unexpectedly turns seemingly “harmless” matters into topics that challenge the totalitarian order.

In the summer of 2005, Hunan TV’s “Super Girl” transformed from an ordinary entertainment program into a social issue in just this way. The discussion raised a series of questions about “democracy,” “citizenship,” and “civil society.” The “Super Girl” incident unexpectedly sparked dissatisfaction with the political status quo, a completely “unintended consequence.” Precisely because it was unintended, there were no “instigators,” so there was no direct target for totalitarian violence to punish. The fans of “Super Girl” seemed to be the protagonists of the event but were not the ones raising the issue of democracy in the related online discussions. For the high and mighty power, these fans were truly elusive and hard to guard against. They appeared simple but were deep and unfathomable, and no matter how much the authorities tried to guard against them, surprises still arose. The fans did not come to call for democracy but unexpectedly sparked a heated discussion about democracy. They merely wanted to sing when they felt like it, have fun when they wanted, but “unintentionally” mocked the “always correct” CCTV, “unintentionally” scorned the nominal “audience representatives,” “unintentionally” resisted hypocritical and ugly politics, and “unintentionally” revealed the lack of democratic mechanisms in public life, enlightening the public’s awareness of participation.

The online public who discussed democracy and civic participation during the “Super Girl” event were not so-called “instigators.” They had no one “provoking” them, no “behind-the-scenes planning,” no “organization,” no “program”; they were just onlookers who gathered and dispersed at will, spectators who watched the fun and stirred the pot. It is precisely in the clamor of these “onlookers” that one can hear the voices of resistance from many people under “neo-totalitarian” rule. This is what is called “non-incidental” resistance. In fact, “neo-totalitarianism” has entered a stage where “non-incidental” resistance is already difficult to defend against, an era where authoritarian punishments often lose their recognizable targets.

Conclusion

“Neo-totalitarianism” is an era of superficial prosperity but moral decay. In the real world of “neo-totalitarianism,” there are words without speech, rule without consensus, magazines without information, newspapers without news, academia without thought, and desires without purpose. “Neo-totalitarianism” is a regime more haunted by autocratic shadows than post-totalitarianism. “Neo-totalitarianism” is a society without a shared political vision or common value prospects.

In the era of the totalitarian prototype and post-totalitarianism, the people habitually accepted the political and social ideals and value prospects provided by the party. In the “neo-totalitarianism” era, the people have not yet broken free from this habit of thought, but they can no longer maintain the same trust in the party as before. In their hesitation, some have turned to nationalism and cultural nationalism after losing faith in official ideology, treating the mere existence of the group as a value goal that needs no further construction by the group; some long for a return to the ancient Confucian tradition, imagining that reciting the classics in childhood can reshape a generation of “new people”; others even look to the prototype model of totalitarianism that once brought great suffering to China, projecting their disappointment and dissatisfaction with Mao’s “neo-totalitarian” successors onto nostalgia for Mao; more people seek a “happy life” that harmonizes with the “atomic” individual’s desires in material satisfaction. The harsh thought control of “neo-totalitarianism” leads them, consciously or unconsciously, to avoid addressing how to escape the dead end of totalitarian rule, how to completely break with the past of totalitarianism, and how to rebuild human norms and ideals for a better society on the value ruins of totalitarian rule. Until people can openly and fearlessly raise and discuss these questions, they will continue to live under the apocalyptic shadow of “neo-totalitarianism.”

[Footnotes] (Omitted)

(This article was published in 2005)

– This text was translated by AI. –