May 17th: The Process of Issuing the Martial Law Order

May 18, 2024

The Standing Committee Meeting on the Evening of May 16th

After meeting with Gorbachev on the evening of the 16th, Zhao Ziyang held a Standing Committee meeting in Zhongnanhai. Frankly speaking, this meeting was not very important, but I’ll briefly mention it. From this meeting, you can observe the conflicts between the opposing sides (reformists vs. conservatives).

During the meeting, the two sides once again engaged in a fierce debate over the definition of the “April 26th Editorial,” with neither side willing to give in. Below is an excerpt from Yang Jisheng’s book, The Political Struggles of the Reform Era in China:

At the Standing Committee meeting on the evening of May 16th, Zhao Ziyang once again proposed that the April 26th Editorial needed to be addressed, as he believed the editorial’s characterization of the student movement was inappropriate and should be revised.
Zhao Ziyang said, “Although I haven’t seen the editorial, I can take responsibility for it.” He added, “The characterization in the April 26th Editorial needs to be changed, but it should in no way implicate Xiaoping. All Xiaoping needs to do is say one sentence: ‘Now it seems that the students’ issues aren’t as serious as previously thought.’ The rest of the work will be up to us.”
Li Peng responded, “There’s no need for you to take responsibility; that’s not the attitude of a statesman.”
Yao Yilin had the same attitude as Li Peng.
Li said, “The April 26th Editorial is based on Deng’s speech.”
Zhao replied, “No, it was the Standing Committee that set the tone, and after reporting to Deng, the speech was made.”
Li retorted, “You said in your telegram from North Korea that you agreed to stop the unrest.”
Zhao responded, “The term ‘unrest’ is neutral. The problem isn’t with the word ‘unrest’ but with the characterization as ‘anti-Party and anti-socialist,’ and that characterization was made by the Standing Committee.”
The meeting ended unhappily.

The Standing Committee meeting on the evening of the 16th continued until the early hours of the next day. The only consensus reached was to issue an open letter in the name of the Politburo Standing Committee on the 17th. However, even the wording of this open letter led to disputes. The following is an excerpt from Reform Journey—Zhao Ziyang’s Memoirs, with added parentheses by me:

On the night of May 16th, after meeting with Gorbachev, I convened a Standing Committee meeting to discuss issuing a public speech (open letter) in the name of the five Standing Committee members to urge students to stop their hunger strike.
The speech draft included the phrase, “The patriotic enthusiasm of the students is commendable, and the Party Central Committee and the State Council acknowledge it,” which was opposed by Li Peng. He said, “It’s enough to say it’s commendable; why acknowledge it?”
Yang Shangkun said, “The students’ anti-corruption stance can be acknowledged.”
I was very annoyed by Li Peng’s comment, so I said, “If we say their patriotic enthusiasm is commendable, why can’t we acknowledge it? If we don’t say this, then we’re not saying anything at all! What’s the point of issuing this public speech if it says nothing? The issue now is how to make the speech (open letter) ease the students’ emotions, not to quibble over words.”
The majority of the Standing Committee supported keeping the phrase, and it was reluctantly passed.

Deng Xiaoping’s Reaction to Zhao Ziyang’s “May 16th Speech”

In the previous article of this series, I detailed the 1989 “Sino-Soviet Summit” and Zhao Ziyang’s remarks during his meeting with Gorbachev (hereafter referred to as the “May 16th Speech”). At that time, I mentioned:

Deng was extremely angry when he learned of Zhao’s speech.

Now, let’s elaborate on that.

Deng’s anger over the “May 16th Speech” was indirectly communicated through his children and those princelings closely connected to the Deng family.

Dai Qing, one of the key figures in the June 4th incident, wrote a memoir that was published in The New York Times (link here), where she mentioned some events that occurred on the 17th (note: “Bao Tong” in the following excerpt was Zhao Ziyang’s political secretary):

Around noon, before 12:00 PM, after learning of the “rumors outside,” Bao Tong entrusted a frequent visitor to the Deng family to call Deng’s residence, hoping to “use Deng Rong to explain to their old man the true intention behind Zhao Ziyang’s speech to Gorbachev the previous day, to avoid any misunderstandings.”
When the call connected, Deng Rong replied, “Please tell Comrade Bao Tong that there is no longer any need to talk about this.” She added, “Our old man is already prepared to be overthrown for the fourth time.” She said this in a very agitated tone and then hung up the phone.
(See Wu Wei’s Behind the Scenes of China’s Political System Reforms in the 1980s)

From Deng Rong’s (Deng Xiaoping’s daughter) words, one can infer the extent of Deng’s anger at that time.

In earlier blog posts in this series, I have spent a lot of time analyzing how Deng viewed the student movement and Zhao’s motives and strategies in handling it, including why Zhao made those remarks to Gorbachev. With Zhao’s political experience and his understanding of Deng, he could have predicted that Deng would be very displeased with those remarks. On the following day (May 17th), Zhao proactively contacted the “Deng Office” (Deng Xiaoping’s office) and proposed to meet Deng privately. After all, Deng had always trusted him before the June 4th incident, and they had a good personal relationship. Zhao certainly did not want their relationship to deteriorate to the point of rupture. However, the “Deng Office” replied that he should attend an “emergency Standing Committee meeting” at Deng’s home at 4:00 PM that afternoon.

In Zhao Ziyang’s Memoirs, it is mentioned:

I initially requested a private meeting with Deng, but Deng decided to hold a Standing Committee meeting at his home, which made me feel uneasy.

Zhao Ziyang faced resistance, as did his secretary Bao Tong. Therefore, Zhao probably had some mental preparation for the Standing Committee meeting on the afternoon of the 17th, but certain developments still caught him off guard.

Next, let’s focus on the “emergency Standing Committee meeting” on May 17th.

The “Emergency Standing Committee Meeting” at Deng’s Residence on May 17th

On the afternoon of May 17th, a crucial “emergency Standing Committee meeting” was held at Deng Xiaoping’s residence (Miliangku Hutong).

Readers, please note: this was not the first time a crucial decision-making meeting was held at Deng’s residence. Earlier in this series, I discussed the “1986 student protests,” during which a key meeting was also held at Deng’s home, leading to the replacement of the General Secretary (replacing Hu Yaobang with Zhao Ziyang).

In fact, several key decision-making meetings during the June 4th incident were held at Deng’s home, fully demonstrating that Deng was the real power holder.

References

This meeting was crucial—it directly led to the issuance of the “Martial Law Order,” which significantly escalated tensions and ultimately culminated in a bloody massacre; the political direction of the nation was also profoundly altered as a result.

Given its importance, it’s necessary to provide a detailed account of this meeting. To accurately reconstruct history, I cross-referenced the descriptions of this meeting from several books. Cross-comparing different sources is helpful for distinguishing the truth from falsehood.

Zhao Ziyang: Reform Journey—Zhao Ziyang’s Memoirs
Li Peng: Critical Moments—Li Peng’s Diary
Chen Xiaoya: The History of the 1989 Democracy Movement
Yang Jisheng: The Political Struggles of the Reform Era in China
Wu Renhua: Chronicle of the 1989 Tiananmen Incident
Zhang Liang (pseudonym): The Tiananmen Papers

Attendees

Those who rushed to Deng’s residence for the meeting included the “five Standing Committee members” at the time (Zhao, Li, Qiao, Hu, and Yao) and Yang Shangkun—who attended as “Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission & Secretary-General of the Central Military Commission.” The Chairman of the National People’s Congress, Wan Li, was on an official visit to Canada at the time; otherwise, he would likely have attended.

Additionally, The History of the 1989 Democracy Movement mentions that Li Xiannian also attended the Standing Committee meeting that day, while The Political Struggles of the Reform Era in China and Chronicle of the 1989 Tiananmen Incident mention that Bo Yibo (Bo Xilai’s father) attended. However, the works of the two participants (Zhao Ziyang and Li Peng) do not mention the participation of Li and Bo. Therefore, their attendance remains uncertain. It is possible that these two elderly officials did not attend the meeting, or they may have attended but did not speak, leading to their omission in the works of the two participants.

Additionally, the meeting minutes were recorded by Wang Ruilin, the “Director of the Deng Office.”

The Meeting Process

After the meeting began, Deng Xiaoping first spoke (essentially saying): “The situation has come to this point; what solutions do you all have?”

As the General Secretary, Zhao Ziyang spoke first. He gave a lengthy speech, with a theme similar to what he had said the night before (the 16th) at the Standing Committee meeting. For the sake of brevity, I will not quote it in full. In summary, he continued to advocate a conciliatory approach to resolving the student movement. The key point was the need to revise the April 26th Editorial, which he believed could greatly ease tensions with the students.

As Zhao spoke, Deng showed signs of impatience (Zhao Ziyang mentioned this detail in his memoirs).

After Zhao finished speaking, Li Peng, as the Premier, spoke second. Li Peng directly targeted Zhao, primarily attacking Zhao Ziyang’s “May 4th Speech,” accusing Zhao of being the main culprit behind the situation getting out of control. In previous Standing Committee meetings, although “Zhao vs. Li” arguments frequently erupted, Li Peng had never spoken so harshly. This caught Zhao Ziyang somewhat by surprise.

Next, Yao Yilin (Wang Qishan’s father-in-law) also attacked Zhao Ziyang in his speech. Yao’s attacks were even more intense than Li Peng’s, listing four major offenses against Zhao and even bringing up old grievances—mentioning Zhao’s son engaging in “official profiteering.” This also took Zhao Ziyang by surprise.

Qiao Shi, another Standing Committee member, played it safe, saying some “politically correct” things without clearly siding with either camp. The other Standing Committee member, Hu Qili, expressed support for revising the April 26th Editorial (indicating that Hu Qili sided with Zhao).

After the Standing Committee members spoke, Yang Shangkun, who was attending the meeting, also expressed his views. He opposed revising the editorial and relayed a suggestion from Liao Hansheng. Yang’s exact words were:

Liao Hansheng advocates for martial law; should we consider implementing martial law?

Yang Shangkun’s statement surprised Zhao Ziyang. In the 29th article of this series, I specifically discussed the “Deng-Zhao-Yang triangle relationship”—Yang Shangkun maintained good personal relationships with both Deng and Zhao. (According to Zhao Ziyang’s Memoirs), before this Standing Committee meeting, Yang had privately expressed opposition to martial law to Zhao. But at this meeting, by quoting Liao Hansheng, Yang effectively supported martial law.

Let me digress briefly:
Liao Hansheng was Yang Shangkun’s brother-in-law, a member of the Central Military Commission, and had served as the First Political Commissar of the Shenyang Military Region; moreover, Yang Shangkun’s younger brother, Yang Baibing, was also a member of the Central Military Commission (while also serving as Director of the General Political Department), and Yang Shangkun himself was Vice Chairman and Secretary-General of the Central Military Commission. The Central Military Commission had only a few seats, and the Yang family occupied three of them, leading to the nickname “Yang Family Warriors” among the people.

Why did Yang’s stance change? First of all, it should be stated that Yang was also a shrewd politician. Zhao felt that Yang’s attitude had changed; I believe there are at least two possibilities:

Possibility 1
Yang initially opposed martial law. But before the meeting on the 17th, he had already sensed Deng’s position (prepared to use force), and when a split between Deng and Zhao emerged, Yang naturally had to align with Deng.

Possibility 2
Yang had been playing both sides from the beginning, advocating for martial law in front of Deng and opposing it in front of Zhao.

Regardless of which possibility it was (considering the special nature of the “Yang Family Warriors”), military martial law was actually beneficial to Yang—in the aftermath of June 4th, the “Yang Family Warriors” gained much more influence in the court, and their power once even surpassed that of the new General Secretary Jiang Zemin. Furthermore, readers who experienced the June 4th incident may remember that for a long time after June 4th, the official propaganda slogan was:

The PLA safeguards reform and opening up.

Readers familiar with the Party-state’s discourse should be able to grasp a lot of information from this propaganda slogan.

(End of digression, back to the main topic)
After all the participants had spoken, Deng Xiaoping delivered a concluding speech, with key points including:

The characterization of the April 26th Editorial was correct and should not be retracted (should not be changed).
The problem lies within the Party’s top leadership, especially Zhao Ziyang’s “May 4th Speech” (Deng’s words were already very blunt at this point).
Martial law must be implemented in Beijing (military control).

(Note: Zhao Ziyang’s Memoirs, Li Peng’s Diary, and The Political Struggles of the Reform Era in China all mention these three points)

Regarding martial law, the five Standing Committee members were deeply divided—Li Peng and Yao Yilin strongly supported it, while Zhao Ziyang strongly opposed it. As for the other two (Hu and Qiao), their stances are described differently in various accounts (the next section will discuss this separately). Ultimately, through some (informal) oral voting, the decision was made to implement martial law (military control) in Beijing.

Faced with this outcome, Zhao Ziyang reluctantly stated:

Having a decision is better than having none, but I am very worried that it will have serious consequences. As the General Secretary, it will be difficult for me to effectively organize and implement this decision.

When Zhao said this, he was actually hinting at his intention to step down. In response to Zhao’s hint, Deng emphasized a few more points:

The minority should obey the majority;
The Party Central Committee should maintain unity;
If this decision turns out to be wrong, everyone will share the responsibility.

The “emergency Standing Committee meeting” ended at 6:00 PM that day. In addition to the decision to impose martial law, the following matters were also determined:

A three-member group consisting of “Li Peng, Yang Shangkun, and Qiao Shi” was formed to implement the “martial law order” (note that Zhao was excluded from this three-member group).
The Standing Committee would continue meeting that evening at Zhongnanhai to discuss how to implement the “martial law order.”
The next day (May 18th), several Standing Committee members would visit the students on hunger strike in the hospital.
A coordination meeting on martial law work would be held the next day (May 18th), where the above-mentioned “three-member group” would report on progress.

Thus, the infamous “Martial Law Order” in Chinese history was born.

Research on the “Five Standing Committee Votes”

Different Accounts from Various Books

Now, let’s delve into the “Five Standing Committee Votes.”
The positions of “Zhao, Li, and Yao” were very clear, so there is no dispute about their inclinations. The differences mainly revolve around the attitudes of “Qiao Shi & Hu Qili.”

Below are the discrepancies from different accounts:

Book	Author	Account
Zhao Ziyang’s Memoirs	Zhao Ziyang	(Note: The book does not explicitly mention a vote on “martial law”; it only mentions the attitude toward “revising the editorial,” where the five Standing Committee members were “two to two,” with Qiao Shi not expressing an opinion)
Li Peng’s Diary	Li Peng	Qiao Shi nodded in agreement, while Hu Qili did not express an opinion (Note: Result three to one)
The History of the 1989 Democracy Movement	Chen Xiaoya	Hu Qili and Qiao Shi both abstained (Note: Result two to one)
The Political Struggles of the Reform Era in China	Yang Jisheng	Hu Qili opposed, Qiao Shi agreed (Note: Result three to two)
Chronicle of the 1989 Tiananmen Incident	Wu Renhua	Hu Qili opposed, Qiao Shi was neutral/abstained (Note: Result two to two)

Take a look—there are so many different accounts of the same event. This example shows that when reconstructing historical truth (especially key historical truths), one often encounters varied accounts. If your “sources of information” are too singular, you are likely to fall into the trap of “one-sided belief.”

Moreover, the sources of information should not only be numerous but also diverse (with information from different positions and camps). For example, the June 4th books shared in my online archive include both “official sources” and “unofficial sources” (from students and intellectuals); both “reformists within the Party” and “conservatives within the Party”; both “domestic authors” and “overseas authors”…

My Personal Analysis

Below is my personal analysis for your reference:

1. On the “Minority Should Obey the Majority” Remark
Several books that discuss this meeting quote Deng Xiaoping’s remark about “the minority should obey the majority.” Therefore, a “two-to-two” situation is not very likely. I believe that the “in favor” outnumbered the “opposed.”

2. Zhao Ziyang Intentionally Downplayed the Issue
In Zhao Ziyang’s Memoirs, there is the following passage:

Here I want to say that in the meeting convened by Deng to decide on martial law and the suppression of students, there was no such thing as a three-to-two vote as reported by foreign media. There were only a few people at the meeting. As for the Standing Committee, the number of attendees that day was two to two, with one neutral. Hu Qili and I advocated revising the editorial, Yao Yilin and Li Peng strongly opposed it, and Qiao Shi was neutral, not expressing an opinion. There was no three-to-two issue. Of course, if you count Deng and Yang, they were not Standing Committee members. If you count all the attendees, they certainly constituted a majority. To be honest, there was no formal Standing Committee vote.

My commentary on the above passage is:
“Revising the editorial” and “implementing martial law” are two entirely different issues. Zhao Ziyang mentioned the vote results on the former in his memoirs but avoided discussing the latter, more important issue.
If the Politburo Standing Committee’s vote on “martial law” had been favorable to Zhao (or a tie), Zhao would have likely emphasized this in his memoirs—to demonstrate that “martial law lacked legal legitimacy.”
On the contrary, his intentional avoidance of the issue suggests that the vote on “martial law” did not go in his favor.

3. The Diverging Fates of “Hu & Qiao”
After the June 4th incident, Qiao Shi continued as a Standing Committee member and later became the Chairman of the National People’s Congress; meanwhile, Hu Qili, who was being groomed as a successor, was quickly sidelined after June 4th (stripped of various positions, retaining only the title of “Central Committee member”).

Even without considering their long-term political trajectories after June 4th, the disparity in their treatment in the week following the “emergency Standing Committee meeting” was already stark—Qiao Shi continued to participate in important high-level meetings (including Standing Committee meetings), while Hu Qili was excluded (indicating that Hu Qili had also been sidelined).

For their treatment to differ so drastically within just a few days likely indicates that “Hu & Qiao” took different stances during this key meeting.
If, as The History of the 1989 Democracy Movement suggests, both “Hu & Qiao” abstained on the issue of “martial law,” then the only difference between them would be on the issue of “revising the editorial” (Hu Qili supported revising it, while Qiao Shi did not express an opinion)—this difference is too minor to justify such a large disparity in their subsequent treatment.

Therefore, it seems less likely that The History of the 1989 Democracy Movement’s claim of “two to one” (both Hu & Qiao abstaining) is accurate.

As a result, I personally believe that the most likely outcome of the vote was either “three to two” or “three to one.”

The Standing Committee’s Attitude—”Form Over Substance”

After all this analysis of the “Five Standing Committee Votes,” it’s important to remind everyone: given the situation at the time, the Politburo Standing Committee’s attitude carried more formal (legal) significance than substantive significance.

The reality at the time was that Deng was the real leader (I have emphasized this point many times throughout this series). Even in the most extreme case, where all five Standing Committee members opposed martial law, if Deng was determined to impose it, the Standing Committee would be powerless to stop him—because Deng had complete control over the Central Military Commission.

This also shows that while the Party-state’s slogan is “The Party commands the gun,” in practice, it often means “The gun commands the Party”—in our country, only those with the gun (military power) can become the Party-state’s top leader.

Hu Qili as a Person

After Hu Qili and Zhao Ziyang lost power together, few people remember him today, so I’ll briefly discuss him:

Born in 1929, Hu Qili was a science student (Physics Department, Mechanical Engineering Department) at Peking University in the 1940s. After graduation, he stayed at the university to work for the Youth League, and during the 1950s, he caught the eye of (Youth League Central Committee leader) Hu Yaobang. Under Hu Yaobang’s strong recommendation, Hu Qili was elected “Alternate Secretary of the Youth League Central Secretariat” at the young age of 32.

During the early stages of the Cultural Revolution, Hu was personally criticized by Mao Zedong and sent to a “May 7th Cadre School” for labor. He resumed work in 1972.

In the early 1980s, when Hu Yaobang was General Secretary, he continued to promote his old subordinate, Hu Qili, who quickly rose through the ranks. From 1980 to the end of 1986, in just over six years, Hu Qili held several positions: “Party Secretary of Tianjin, Director of the Central Office, Secretary of the Central Secretariat, Politburo member.”

When Hu Yaobang was ousted, many people (especially conservatives in the court) wanted Hu Qili to be ousted along with him. But the new General Secretary, Zhao Ziyang, still valued Hu Qili and nominated him to join the Five-Person Group. This was essentially a promotion—preparing him for entry into the Standing Committee at the 13th Party Congress.

What was the significance of the Five-Person Group? After Hu Yaobang was ousted in January 1987, the next Party Congress (the 13th) was still several months away. Deng suggested forming a Five-Person Group to act on behalf of the Politburo Standing Committee. Although Hu Yaobang had stepped down (as General Secretary), he was still a Standing Committee member. But Deng didn’t want Hu Yaobang to interfere in government affairs, so he created the Five-Person Group to act on behalf of the Standing Committee, effectively sidelining Hu Yaobang.

The Five-Person Group was decided by Deng and Zhao and included the following five people: Zhao Ziyang, Yang Shangkun, Bo Yibo, Wan Li, and Hu Qili. Among them, “Yang and Bo” were elderly members of the Central Advisory Commission and were not expected to join the next Standing Committee (the 13th Congress), leaving the other three. If nothing went wrong, all three would enter the Standing Committee.

At the 13th Congress in October 1987, Hu Qili smoothly entered the Standing Committee and became its youngest member. Wan Li, however, faced an unexpected situation and did not enter the Standing Committee (for details on what happened, see the 8th article in this series, “Rearranging Seats at the 13th Congress”).

According to the court’s tradition, the youngest Standing Committee member is usually groomed as a successor, and with General Secretary Zhao Ziyang’s favor, Hu Qili was poised to become the next General Secretary if not for the “June 4th” incident.

Zhao Ziyang’s Two Letters

An Unsent “Resignation Letter”

Because Deng had already publicly criticized Zhao’s “May 4th Speech” at the afternoon Standing Committee meeting, it was clear to everyone present that Zhao’s political career was essentially over.

So, after returning home, Zhao Ziyang immediately instructed his political secretary, Bao Tong, to draft a resignation letter, which was then submitted to the “Central Office” (the General Office of the Central Committee). However, Yang Shangkun learned of this and called Zhao, strongly advising him not to submit the resignation (Yang’s reasoning was that given the dangerous situation, if the General Secretary resigned at this moment, it would only worsen the situation).

Zhao heeded Yang’s advice and notified his secretary the next day (May 18th) to withdraw the letter.

A Private Letter That Received No Response

On the day after the emergency Standing Committee meeting, Zhao Ziyang made one last effort to try to change Deng’s stance (although he knew the chances were slim).

After the student movement began, some well-known figures in China (including some prominent Party members) wrote letters to the Party Central Committee, urging the government to properly assess the students’ patriotic movement. Some of these letters were forwarded to Zhao Ziyang, who selected a few to send to Deng, along with his own handwritten letter (content below):

Comrade Xiaoping:
Attached are appeals from several influential comrades; please have a look.
The situation is very serious now, and the most urgent task is to get the students to stop their hunger strike (this is what garners the most sympathy from the public) and avoid casualties. The key demand for the students to stop the hunger strike is to remove the label and change the characterization in the April 26th Editorial, acknowledging that their actions are patriotic.
After much deliberation, I believe we must make this concession. As long as our main leaders personally go to the public and announce this acknowledgment, the public’s emotions will greatly ease, and other problems will be easier to solve. Even if we need to take decisive measures to maintain order, we must first take this step before acting. Otherwise, taking tough actions in the face of severe public opposition could lead to serious consequences that threaten the Party and the country’s fate.
With deep concern, I once again ask you to consider this suggestion.

Zhao Ziyang
May 18th

This batch of letters was sent out but received no response (it is unknown whether Deng even saw them).

Zhao Ziyang’s Political Career Draws to a Close

Although his resignation attempt failed, Zhao Ziyang’s departure from power was imminent. His subsequent actions actually accelerated his fall from power.

Zhao Was Marginalized

In the previous section, I mentioned that Zhao sent out a resignation letter and then withdrew it at Yang’s persuasion. If even Yang Shangkun knew about this letter, Deng Xiaoping must have known as well. It is even possible that Deng knew first and had Yang intervene to persuade Zhao to withdraw it.

Although Deng had decided to depose Zhao, the timing was crucial—removing Zhao before the situation in Beijing calmed down could potentially cause the situation to spiral further out of control. Deng did not want this to happen. Additionally, Deng did not want Zhao to make any moves or statements that would signal a split in the Party Central Committee. Reflecting on the “emergency Standing Committee meeting” discussed at the beginning of this article, Deng specifically emphasized the need for Party Central Committee unity before the meeting ended, indicating how much he valued this.

Based on this analysis, Deng’s strategy on May 17th and 18th was likely to first marginalize Zhao while retaining the title of “General Secretary” in name.

Signs of this marginalization can also be found in Zhao Ziyang’s Memoirs (below is an excerpt from the book):

After the meeting at Deng’s home on May 17th, Li Peng and others acted very unusually. Whether it was going to the hospital to visit students or to the square to see the students, he repeatedly prevented me from going. When I went with him and got out of the car, he broke protocol and walked ahead of me. He even had someone notify the photographers (someone told me this later) not to take pictures of me, saying that if there was a personnel change, it would be awkward.
From the evening of May 17th to the 19th, I was not informed about anything related to martial law. I only found out about Li Peng’s dialogue with the students on the 19th when I saw it on TV. However, on the afternoon of May 19th, I suddenly received a notice about the martial law announcement meeting that evening and Li Peng’s speech, asking me to preside over the meeting and speak. But they didn’t tell me anything beforehand about how the meeting would be held, where it would be held, who would attend, or what the content would be.

The above excerpt refers to the martial law meeting held on the 19th in Beijing, officially called the “Central Committee and Beijing Party, Government, and Military Cadres Meeting.” This was a relatively large meeting, with participants including members from “the Central Committee, the State Council, the Central Military Commission, the Central Advisory Commission, the Central Discipline Inspection Commission, the Beijing Municipal Committee, the Central Office,” and other key departments.

According to the original plan, Zhao was to preside (as he was still the General Secretary on the day of the meeting), and Zhao and Li were to deliver reports on behalf of the “Central Committee and the State Council.”

However, Zhao refused to preside over the meeting and even declined to attend.

Zhao Distances Himself from “Martial Law”

Why did Zhao refuse to participate in the martial law meeting on the 19th?
I’ve mentioned more than once that Zhao was a shrewd person—he certainly understood what being marginalized meant. By refusing to attend the martial law meeting, he effectively distanced himself from “martial law.”

In the earlier posts of this series, I analyzed his motives—for him, if he couldn’t retain power, he at least wanted to preserve his reputation. Now that he was marginalized, his removal was imminent. If he complied with Deng’s arrangements and presided over such a large martial law meeting, how would future historians judge him? He might even be labeled a “butcher.” Clearly, he didn’t want to bear that burden.

With similar considerations in mind, when he and Li Peng visited the hunger-striking students at the square on the morning of the 19th, Zhao delivered that touching impromptu speech. The impromptu speech at the square on the 19th was essentially Zhao Ziyang’s political curtain call (in future posts in this series, I will continue to introduce the events of May 18th and 19th).

Deng Xiaoping Accelerates the “Deposition Process”

Zhao Ziyang’s actions, from his perspective, were meant to distance himself from “martial law.” But for Deng Xiaoping, this signaled “creating a split in the Party Central Committee”—making it evident to outsiders that the Party Central Committee was not a unified body. (As mentioned earlier) Deng was highly sensitive to such things. So when Deng learned that Zhao refused to attend the martial law meeting, his animosity toward Zhao reached a new height. As a result, Deng accelerated the “deposition process” (in future posts in this series, I will continue to introduce how Deng deposed Zhao and elevated Jiang Zemin by the end of May).

This article is reposted from: https://program-think.blogspot.com/2020/07/june-fourth-incident-34.html

– This text was translated by AI. –